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Abstract
This paper investigates whether or not there is co-waved merger and acquisition (Mactivity in
26 OECD countries. We apply the Markov Switching model to panel data (MSP hereafter),
an approach which has not previously been attempted. Two distinct regimes are recognized in
emerge from MAdata: the wave merger regime and normal merger regime. Our MSP
captures the co-wave pattern of the sample countries and has a much better fit than either the
univariate Markov Switching model or the conventional linear panel model.
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Studies on the wave patterns of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity have recently received
wide attention as researchers increasingly delve into whether there are oscillations between high
and low levels of M&A activity, that is, whether M&A activity is characteristically in clear-cut
waves. Brealey and Myers (1991, p. 846) do clearly advocate that “mergers come in waves”
and consider the lack of any explanation for this phenomenon among the ten most important
unsolved mysteries in the ﬁeld of ﬁnance (p. 923).1 In the same vein, Scherer and Ross (1990)
described aggregate mergeractivity as episodic and pointedout four prominent waves, or peaks,–
one clustered around the turn of the century, two others in 1929 and 1968 and a fourth during the
early and mid-1980s. Recent anecdotal evidence documents that a ﬁfth wave has since occurred,
and this at the end of the1990s.2
While the occurrence of such episodes seems to support the existence of M&A waves, empiri-
cal studies have, however, reached mixed results. Shugart and Tollison (1984) rejected the notion
of wave patterns because by using annual data on U.S.A. M&As from 1895-1979, they found that
M&A levels had been characterized by a unit root process. By contrast, Audretesch (1989) fully
lent their support for the wave pattern theory by demonstrating that U.S.A. M&A activity echoes
clear-cut life cycles. That is, M&A activity oscillates between high and low levels, which they in-
terpret as a clear sign of the wave phenomenon. Golbe and White’s (1993) ﬁnding of a sine-curve
for merger behavior gave further evidence in favor of wave patterns.
Among the ﬁrst to explore the wave issue was Town (1992) who employed the univariate
Markov Switching (MS hereafter) model of Hamilton (1989). He provided evidence that the MS
model ﬁts the M&A data much better than linear ARIMA models, and this, he concluded, was
likely a product of the fact the MS model imposes fewer limitations on data and can endoge-
nously generate wave behavior through Hamilton’s ﬁlter. The model typically separates data into
two regimes, where heated M&A activity occurs in one regime (wave regime) and inert M&A
activity in the other (normal regime), thereby causing total M&A activity to behave like a cycle.
Resende (1999) also used the MS model to capture merger wave behavior in sixteen sectoral M&A
1Factors that cause M&A waves may include government encouragement and deregulation policy, business cycle
effects (Nelson, 1959; Yagil, 1996; Post, 1994), oligopolistic behavior reaction, stock market booms (Shleifer and Vishny
(2003) and more.
2Bloomberg News, April 6, 2006.
1data sets for the U.K. and found that the wave phenomenon exists in each sectoral data set. Fur-
thermore, the sixteen sectoral M&A waves appear to display co-movements. Interestingly, the
extant literature related to mergers makes it clear that there are two common characteristics which
are shared by empirical studies concerning time series studies of exchange rates. First, the focused
series was once characterized by a random walk; for examples, see Meese and Rogoff (1983) for
exchange rates and Shugart and Tollison (1984) for mergers. Secondly, recent studies show that
the series is characterized by waves; for examples, see Engel and Hamilton (1990) for exchange
rates and Town (1992) for mergers.
The aim of this paper is to examine M&A wave activity among 26 selected OECD countries,
and it achieves this by using a newly-devised model, the Markov Switching Panel (MSP) Model.
Past studiesonM&A waves have exclusively focusedonM&Aactivity in the U.S.A.and U.K.. The
present research departs from that trend by employing quarterly M&A data for 26 selected OECD
countries. Our goal is to determine whether or not M&A activity in OECD countries occurs in
intermittent waves, and whether such M&A waves, if they exist, share a common pattern among
all of these countries or not. To explore these issues, we adopt the conventional univariate MS
model as well as the MSP model. The exercise is worthwhile because scholarly interest in merger
time series continues unabated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the Markov Switching
Panel Model we employ. Section 3 explains the data we use, while Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings and offers some concluding remarks.
2 Methodology
Asea and Blomberg (1998) are credited with being the ﬁrst to develop the MSP model which is
brieﬂy described below. We assume there are n = 1, 2,..., 26 which represent 26 individual
OECD countries, and the data span is t = 1, 2,..., T. Supposing that the true data generating
process comes from a two-regime Markov Switching model, we label regime one (St = 1) the
high mean regime, or the “wave” period, and regime two (St = 2) the low mean regime, or the
“normal” period. Since the estimations from boththe MS model and the MSP model have a higher
mean in State 1, we refer to it as the wave period.
It is assumed that the unobserved state variable St follows a ﬁrst ordertwo-state Markov chain
2and has the following transition probabilities:
Pr[St = 1|St−1 =] = p11, Pr[St = 2|St−1 = 2] = p22,
Pr[St = 2|St−1 = 1] = 1− p11, Pr[St = 1|St−1 = 2] = 1− p22. (1)
It is also assumed that the probability for the initial state is ρj = p(S0 = j), i.e., the ergodic
probability for S0 = j. Then the speciﬁcation for the Markov Switching Panel model is written as:
ynt = µn(j) + εnt(j), when St = j, (2)
where ynt is the numberof M&As forthe nthcountryat period t, and µn(j) is themean of the value
of the M&A activity of the nth country at regime j. The “individual effect” in the MSP model is
denoted as µn(j), and the error term for the ith equation in State j after the ﬁxed effect is taking




Because equation (2) is a modiﬁcation of the Least- Square Dummy Variable model (hereafter
LSDV), we refer to it as the Markov Switching Panel Least Square Dummy Variable model (here-
after MSP-LSDV). We re-write equation (2) in a more compact form. Thus:
yt = Dµ(j) + εt(j),εt(j) ∼ N(0,σ2(j))IN×1,
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If the individual effect for each country is the same, i.e., µ(j) = µ1(j) = µ2(j) =     = µN(j),
then the MSP-LSDV model is reduced to:
yt = µ(j)D + εt(j),εt(j) ∼ N(0,σ2(j))IN×1.
We refer to this as the Markov Switching Panel Pooled model (hereafter MSP-Pooled). Because the
MSP-Pooled model is a newly-devised derivative of the MSP-LSDV model, we can simply apply
the likelihood ratio test to perform model selection.
33 Data and Results
Twenty-six OECD countries are taken into account in this study. They are Austria, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands Antilles, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S.A. Quarterly
data from 1990:Q1 to 2005:Q2 are used in our empirical study, and these are all taken from Thom-
son Securities Data Company (SDC) data bank. We ﬁrst apply the unit root test (which is the
Augmented-Dickey Fuller test, ADF) to check the stationary properties of the M&A data. Worth
bearing in mind is that according to Shugart and Tollison (1984), there can be no wave if a series
has a unit root. In this study, because of a small t-ratio, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the
existence of the unit root, which would imply the rejection of wave patterns. This result, however,
may be superﬁcial because, as stressed by Perron (1989), the ADF test has a tendency to accept the
null when a series has experienced one or more structural breaks. A switch between two regimes,
as we claimed here, is also one type of structural change which, in fact, may lower the power of
the ADF unit root test. This motivates us to conduct our estimations from the regime switching
model.3
Table 1 summarizes the estimated results from the univariate MS model. There is no question
that the mean of“the wave regime” (µ1) is substantially different from that of “the normal regime”
(µ2). For example, µ1 and µ2 are 645 and 398, respectively, for Germany, 549 and 108 for Japan,
1187 and 844 for the U.K., and 3757 and 2345, respectively, for the U.S. They are also signiﬁcantly
different from zero at the conventional level. The estimated transition probabilities, p11 and p22,
are around 0.85 to 0.98, indicating that the duration period for remaining in a particular regime is
quite long. This property is similar to the “long swing” phenomenon for the nominal exchange
rate, reported by Engel and Hamilton (1990). It is not easy to evaluate the variances of the two
regimes since some countries, albeit not all, have similar standard errors. Irregardless, however,
the variances across remaining countries are markedly different.
We examine whether the mean of the two regimes are the same or not. Our null of the equal
means (Engle and Hamilton, 1990) is:
H′
0 : µ1 = µ2,
3The scatter plots, the basic statistics and the results of the ADF test of the M&A activity in each of the 26 OECD
countries are available from the authors upon request.
4and the Wald test statistic is:
[ ˆ µ1 − ˆ µ2]2
  var(ˆ µ1) +   var(ˆ µ2) − 2   cov(ˆ µ1, ˆ µ2)
∼ χ2(1).
This test statistic is free of the nuisance parameter problem, as discussed in Engel and Hamilton
(1990).4 Estimated results of the null of the equal means (H′
0) are reported in the second column
fromtheright inTable 1. ExceptforAustria, thenullhypothesisofequalmeans is overwhelmingly
rejected. Accordingly, it is concluded that M&A activity does indeed switch between the two
regimes, i.e., the wave regime and the normal regime.
We also examine whetherthe merger activities follow the Markov mechanism–that is, whether
the number of M&A activities change for a period that cannot be completely independent of the
regime that prevailed in the previous period. The null hypothesis of dependence is:
H′′
0 : p11 = 1− p22, and µ1  = µ2, σ2
1  = σ2
2.
Engel and Hamilton (1990) suggested using the following the Wald statistic:
[ ˆ p11 − (1− ˆ p22)]2
  var( ˆ p11) +   var( ˆ p22) + 2   cov(ˆ 11, ˆ p22)
∼ χ2(1).
The Wald test results are reported in the last column of Table 1. Because the Wald statistics are
overwhelmingly signiﬁcant, we reject the notion that the transition probabilities are dependent,
indicating the M&A data do have a Markov mechanism. In addition, the high estimated transition
probabilities suggest that a M&A wave has the “long swing” property.
We omit the graphs of the ﬁltered and smoothed probabilities of M&A for each country be-
cause of space limitations and they are available from the authors upon request. However, three
interesting ﬁndings are worth noting. First, the estimated ﬁltered and smoothed probabilities
reach unity in 2000 for all OECD countries, indicating that it is a wave regime. Second, except
for Mexico, New Zealand and Norway, the merger activities are rather few and far between for
the remaining OECD countries in 1997. Third, though the graphs are based on a univariate study,
there is a similar pattern of co-movement among the 26 OECD countries. Resende (1999) also
found that sectoral patterns of M&A waves had co-movement.
We next employ the MSP model to examine the co-movement feature of M&A activities. Recall
that Table 1 shows that variances across countries are substantially different. This may result in
4Many tests in switching models suffer from the nuisance problem. Readers are referred to Hansen (1992, 1996) and
Garcia (1998) for details.
5strong heteroscedasticityeven thoughwe control for the individual effect when applying the MSP
model. Thus, we ﬁrst adopt the weighedleast-square to remove the heteroscedasticityby dividing
each country’s standard deviation. Table 2 reports the estimated results from the conventional
Pooled and LSDV models. All of the coefﬁcients of the dummy variables of all countries are
signiﬁcant except for d13 (Netherlands Antilles). We then examine the existence of the individual
effect. The null hypothesis of no individual effects is:
H
′′′
0 : d1 = d2 =     = d25 = 0.
The log-likelihood values for the Pooled and LSDV models are −2797.0 and −2274.2, respectively,
making the log-likelihood ratio (LR hereafter) 2×(−2274.2+2797.0) = 1045.6 , which far exceeds
the critical value of the Chi-square distraction of 37.65 at the 5% level. Therefore, the null of the
no individual effect is decisively rejected, and distinct preference is given to the LSDV model over
the Pooled model.
Table 3 reports the estimated results for the MSP-Pooled and MSP-LSDV models. Again, we
ﬁrst use the LR statistics to examine the existence of the individual effects. With the log-likelihood
values for the MSP-Pooled and MSP-LSDV models being −2261.5 and −1726.5, respectively, the
LR statistic is 2 × (−1726.5 + 2261.5) =1070. Once again, as this is greater than the critical value
of =67.50, the MSP-Pooled model is outright rejected; thus, the discussion below is based on the
MSP-LSDV model. We also calculate the LR statistics using the conventional LSDV model as the
null hypothesis (no switching) and the MSP-LSDV model as the alternative. The LR statistic is
2 × (−1726.5 + 2274.2) = 1095.4, which also exceeds the critical value of 42.56. Thus, the MSP-
LSDV is preferable to the conventional LSDV model. This is highly indicative of the fact that the
sample countries follow a Markov Switching process, thus conﬁrming the existence of common
M&A waves.5
The last two columns of Table 3 report the means of the wave regime and the normal regime,
which are 4.71 and 2.94, respectively, values which are signiﬁcantly different from zero. The esti-
mated transition probabilities for the two regimes are p11 = 0.96 and p22 = 0.93, respectively.
Again, these high estimated transition probabilities indicate that M&A waves have the “long
swing” property.
Figure 1 illustrates the average ﬁltered probabilities from the MSP-LSDV model. According to
5Note that the LR test here suffers from the problem of the non-identiﬁed nuisance parameters. However, because
the LR statistics are far greater than the critical values, the null might still be rejected.
6Hamilton (1989), the standard line of 0.5 is placed. As shown in the Figure, there are three small
peaks: at the beginning of 1992, 1995 and 2000. The highest value falls in 2000, which coincides
with the results from the univariate Markov Switching model. Also, in the 1997 sample period,
the probability drop is similar to that of the univariate Markov switching model. There can be no
doubt that the MS model and the MSP-LSDV model roughly show the same trend in most years,
and this is especially so in 2000 and 1997. Given the weight of the evidence, we believe the MSP
can really successfully describe the M&A co-movement phenomenon in our sample.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the co-waved merger and acquisition activity in 26 OECD countries. The
novelty of this paper is that we apply the conventional Markov Switching model to merger panel
data (MSP here), an approach which has not been attempted in the past. Two regimes are char-
acterized in the M&As data: the wave and normal regimes. Our MSP cannot reject the co-wave
pattern of the sample countries. Apart from this, our MSP model has a far better ﬁtting than the
univariate MS model and the conventional linear Panel model. Also found is that M&A activity
is characterized by long swing behavior. That is, the duration period for staying in a particular
regime is relatively long as shown in the high estimated transition probabilities. This implies that
if industries decide to merge, then the merger wave could persist for quite some time.
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8Table 1: Univariate Markov Switching model (1990:Q1–2005:Q2)
Countries µ1 µ2 p11 p22 σ1 σ2 H′
0 H′′
0
Austria 73.44 58.50 0.92 0.95 39.48 13.72 2.36 114.85*
(10.09)* (3.00)* (0.06)* (0.04)* (6.70)* (1.91)*
Czech 68.12 22.59 0.85 0.96 17.63 15.37 60.18* 59.97*
Republic (5.59)* (2.46)* (0.10)* (0.03)* (3.70)* (1.75)*
Denmark 89.98 49.54 0.96 0.86 28.07 7.57 72.85* 69.44*
(4.23)* (2.17)* (0.03)* (0.09)* (2.68)* (1.74)*
Finland 152.90 96.24 0.89 0.96 27.37 27.56 46.84* 83.66*
(8.28)* (5.28)* (0.08)* (0.04)* (4.69)* (3.48)*
Germany 645.27 398.11 0.89 0.95 129.78 97.31 68.25* 78.43*
(31.61)* (16.93)* (0.08)* (0.04) * (20.91)* (13.65)*
Greece 62.07 12.63 0.90 0.93 31.60 5.02 59.07* 158.06*
(6.41)* (0.88)* (0.05)* (0.04)* (4.08)* (0.68)*
Hungary 72.79 30.45 0.85 0.95 18.44 11.36 51.24* 58.36*
(6.27)* (2.05)* (0.09)* (0.03)* (3.70)* (1.42)*
Iceland 9.76 0.56 0.98 0.98 5.32 1.00 115.21* 933.01*
(0.85)* (0.16)* (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.73)* (0.12)*
Ireland 77.00 44.74 0.90 0.98 16.24 11.68 43.90* 86.87*
(4.86)* (1.76)* (0.09)* (0.02)* (3.33)* (1.24)*
Italy 199.92 146.49 0.93 0.77 55.68 15.74 20.79* 11.94*
(14.06)* (9.21)* (0.10)* (0.13)* (6.02)* (9.43)
Japan 549.81 108.22 0.98 0.98 165.05 46.90 187.04* 808.40*
(31.82)* (8.06)* (0.02)* (0.02)* (23.22)* (5.80)*
Luxembourg 24.56 12.61 0.90 0.96 4.35 4.71 56.04* 86.99*
(1.55)* (0.82)* (0.08)* (0.03)* (1.00)* (0.54)*
Netherlands 225.92 171.88 0.92 0.96 67.31 22.39 11.18* 149.58*
Antilles (15.81)* (3.77)* (0.06)* (0.03)* (7.00)* (2.78)*
Mexico 61.31 35.09 0.80 0.96 8.98 9.54 55.15* 34.58*
(3.27)* (1.48)* (0.12)* (0.03)* (2.27)* (0.98)*
New 122.58 45.12 0.98 0.96 34.08 17.50 141.84* 237.82*
Zealand (4.66)* (4.90)* (0.02)* (0.05)* (3.48)* (3.80)*
Norway 128.20 69.51 0.90 0.97 23.54 21.34 46.67* 97.05*
(9.12)* (3.89)* (0.08)* (0.03)* (4.87)* (2.53)*
Poland 81.89 27.60 0.92 0.95 28.80 12.39 73.12* 166.92*
(6.44)* (2.55)* (0.05)* (0.04)* (3.94)* (1.68)*
Portugal 50.43 22.35 0.93 0.92 16.06 8.02 60.96* 92.92*
(3.22)* (1.94)* (0.05)* (0.06)* (2.04)* (1.41)*
Slovak 12.85 1.36 0.96 0.92 6.28 1.78 118.09* 136.22*
Republic (1.01)* (0.45)* (0.03)* (0.06)* (0.70)* (0.35)*
South 90.66 21.16 0.98 0.98 25.83 15.83 156.92* 704.64*
Korea (4.79)* (2.93)* (0.02)* (0.02)* (3.48)* (2.12)*
Spain 217.47 84.77 0.96 0.94 58.16 20.75 163.22* 244.10*
(11.08)* (6.31)* (0.03)* (0.05)* (6.76)* (5.43)*
Sweden 250.26 135.24 0.90 0.97 44.17 34.86 58.55* 92.30*
(15.33)* (5.67)* (0.08)* (0.03)* (10.09)* (4.04)*
Switzerland 153.63 104.85 0.90 0.96 61.33 15.25 9.07* 98.42*
(16.14)* (2.10)* (0.08)* (0.03)* (8.42)* (1.61)*
Turkey 28.06 11.23 0.92 0.98 11.02 4.54 33.86* 86.87*
(2.82)* (0.72)* (0.08)* (0.03)* (1.76)* (0.54)*
U.K. 1187.93 844.76 0.87 0.96 103.71 78.84 163.54* 102.09*
(23.06)* (10.96)* (0.08)* (0.03)* (17.98)* (8.36)*
U.S.A. 3757.82 2354.58 0.94 0.98 458.29 351.23 161.13* 381.34*
(110.91)* (62.63)* (0.04)* (0.02) * (78.4)* (43.39)*
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
The critical values for H′
0 and H′′
0 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 6.63, 3.84 and 2.71, respectively.
9Table 2: Conventional Panel model (1990:Q1–2005:Q2)
parameter Pooled Model LSDV Model




























Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
10Table 3: Markov Switching Panel Model (1990:Q1–2005:Q2)
parameter MSP-Pooled Model MSP-LSDV model
St = 1 St = 2
µ(1) 2.95 (0.05)* 4.71 (0.17)*
µ(2) 0.82 (0.05)* 2.94 (0.09)*
d1 −0.99 (0.30)* −1.04 (0.13)*
d2 −2.82 (0.22)* −2.46 (0.16)*
d3 −1.62 (0.23)* −1.39 (0.19)*
d4 −0.98 (0.26)* −0.64 (0.14)*
d5 −0.91 (0.24)* −0.64 (0.13)*
d6 −2.17 (0.29)* −2.40 (0.13)*
d7 −1.56 (0.30)* −1.66 (0.13)*
d8 −2.68 (0.29)* −2.73 (0.13)*
d9 −0.62 (0.29)* −0.58 (0.13)*
d10 −0.17 (0.29) −0.08 (0.13)
d11 −2.47 (0.23)* −2.49 (0.13)*
d12 −1.74 (0.26)* −1.37 (0.14)*
d13 0.25 (0.27) 0.24 (0.13)
d14 −0.62 (0.37) −0.57 (0.13)*
d15 −2.01 (0.21)* −1.94 (0.18)*
d16 −0.89 (0.31)* −0.90 (0.13)*
d17 −2.37 (0.24)* −2.16 (0.14)*
d18 −1.62 (0.28)* −1.50 (0.13)*
d19 −2.83 (0.23)* −2.57 (0.17)*
d20 −2.50 (0.23)* −2.42 (0.14)*
d21 −1.76 (0.24)* −1.68 (0.14)*
d22 −0.61 (0.32) −0.76 (0.13)*
d23 −0.15 (0.29) −0.48 (0.12)*
d24 −1.98 (0.27)* −1.87 (0.13)*
d25 1.68 (0.26)* 1.56 (0.13)*
σ(1) 1.08 (0.03)* 0.75 (0.02)*
σ(2) 0. 55 (0.02)* 0.55 (0.01)*
p11 0.93 (0.01)* 0.96 (0.01)*
p22 0.97 (0.01)* 0.93 (0.01)*
Log-L −2261.47 −1726.50
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
11The average filtered probability from the MSP-LSDV model








Figure 1: Average ﬁltered probabilities from the MSP-LSDV model (1990:Q1–2005:Q2).
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